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Strengthening the Eﬃ  ciency 
of Public Procurement
P ublic procurement, the generic term used to refer to procurement contracts (traditional procurement), public service delegations (including concessions) 
and public private partnerships, currently represents today 
signiﬁ cant amounts of money as it is believed to account 
for nearly 15% of the GDP in France. Whilst the public pro-
curement system must strive to achieve the best possible 
performance in terms of cost and service, its ineﬃ  cien-
cy is highlighted on a regular basis. In (actual) fact, subs-
tantial gains could be achieved through a more eﬃ  cient 
management of the system. The present Note examines 
potential avenues of action, in the framework of the regu-
latory changes currently under way at European level, with 
the aim of increasing the eﬃ  ciency of the public procure-
ment system.
The contracts upon which the public procurement system 
is based are subject to certain asymmetries of information 
(in that the company is more familiar with its costs and the 
economic environment than the public party) and contrac-
tual incompleteness (since it is impossible to foresee 
every possible event that might arise during the execution 
of the contract). This being the case, the economic analy-
sis recommends that competitive forces be used where-
ver possible when it comes to selecting partners and that 
incentive mechanisms be put in place to establish a real 
commitment of the parties concerned.
New European Directives regarding procurement contracts 
and concessions, approved in 2014 and expected to be 
transposed by 2016, will give public authorities greater 
ﬂ exibility to negotiate with companies at both the selection 
stage and the execution stage (renegotiation). We believe 
this change to be a positive and economically justiﬁ ed one. 
It is, however, crucial that it be supported by speciﬁ c terms 
governing its management that are not currently outlined in 
the Directives. Our recommendations are based on three key 
avenues, namely transparency, competition and expertise.
The negotiation procedure must be supported by transpa-
rent information both prior to and following negotiation. 
During the execution stage, it must be possible for amend-
ments to contracts to be contested without debilitating 
the process by facilitating an increase in the number of 
futile appeals. We also put forward a number of recom-
mendations designed to encourage greater transparency 
where public procurement is concerned.
For the purposes of intensifying competition at the tende-
ring stage it would be useful to limit the number of elec-
tronic information platforms and to merge them towards a 
high-performance standardised model. At the same time, 
it is advisable to simplify procedures, to increase the pro-
fessionalisation of public buyers and to centralise the 
most standard of purchases in order to beneﬁ t from eco-
nomies of scale and pool the experience of public buyers.
Finally, with regards to large-scale projects, we would 
recommend that a comparative evaluation be performed 
beforehand in order to determine the most appropriate 
public procurement tool to meet the needs of the public 
authorities concerned. The agency responsible for this 
prior evaluation would also perform ex post evaluations 
with a view to drawing lessons regarding the various tools 
and procedures available.
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Do it yourself or delegate it? This is the ﬁ rst question a public 
administration must answer when looking at providing a 
new infrastructure or public service. Once it has decided 
to outsource the task (delegate), the public authority ﬁ nds 
itself faced with a second choice, namely how to outsource 
it, i.e. by means of a procurement contract (traditional pro-
curement), public service delegation (concession or lease 
contracts)  or a public private partnerships, options that we 
will refer to here under the generic term of “public procure-
ment” (see infra). Finally, having selected the type of outsour-
cing operation to be implemented, there comes the need to 
determine the way in which prospective bidders will be pitted 
against one another, the design of the contract, and how it will 
be monitored throughout the various stages of the project.
Existing research into public procurement suggests that out-
sourcing has mixed eﬀ ects in terms of service quality and 
cost.1 However, it is not so much the decision to outsource as 
the method of outsourcing –and above all its implementation- 
that present a problem. Indeed, risk-sharing as laid down in the 
contract is a central issue. The present Note explores various 
ways of improving the eﬃ  ciency of the public procurement 
system once the decision to call upon an external partner has 
been made. The amounts at stake, whilst somewhat diﬃ  cult 
to determine, are certainly signiﬁ cant, with public administra-
tion purchases in 2011 accounting for some 15% of the GDP in 
France, as well as in the United Kingdom and Germany.2
Risk-sharing in public contracts: 
contributions from economic analysis
Risk-sharing between public and private entities needs above 
all else to take account of the asymmetry of information that 
exists between these two players. The company is naturally 
more familiar with the technology available, the cost of sup-
plying what is required and indeed the demand for the pro-
ducts and services concerned by the public procurement ope-
ration in question. Furthermore, cost and demand are to some 
extent linked to its decisions with regards to managing human 
resources, choosing production capacities, research and deve-
lopment, service quality, risk management, etc. In order to over-
come these asymmetries of information, it may, for example, 
prove worthwhile to benchmark the company’s performance 
against that of similar companies operating in diﬀ erent mar-
kets, or indeed to auction a public service concession in order 
to identify the company oﬀ ering the best levels of performance.
The sharing of risk between the contracting parties is cen-
tral in situations in which there is an asymmetry of informa-
tion since it determines both the level of accountability of the 
company and its potential proﬁ t earnings. Take, for example, 
cost-risk. There are two potential contractual models (as well 
as in-between models) in terms of cost-sharing:3
 – the ﬁ rst involves reimbursing the company for the costs 
incurred, accompanied by a predetermined payment, in 
the form of a “cost-plus” contract for non-market ser-
vices and a “cost-of-service” regulation contract for 
market services. This ﬁ rst model relieves the company 
of its responsibility but does limit potential proﬁ t;
 – the second involves a “ﬁ xed-price” contract in the case 
of non-market public projects or, for market services, 
a “price cap” regulation contract, in other words one 
that is not index-linked to the actual cost of production. 
This second model allocates a ﬁ xed sum to the contrac-
tor, regardless of the actual costs incurred and of the 
level of demand. This requires greater eﬀ ort on the 
part of the contractor with regards to controlling costs 
but does leave it with a substantial proﬁ t if its costs 
happen to be particularly low (or demand particularly 
high), irrespective of the amount of eﬀ ort required on 
its part.
The contractor can be held accountable in a number of ways, 
including with regards to the cost of constructing the work, 
its operating costs and demand, among other things. In the 
case of an infrastructure project, one means of holding the 
contractor accountable is to link the design and construction 
stages with the future operation of the infrastructure, since 
the contractor then has nothing to gain from squeezing costs 
too much on the ﬁ rst part of the contract if this will have to 
be compensated for in the form of maintenance costs at the 
operational stage. It can, however, be diﬃ  cult for the public 
authority to put in place enforceable long-term contracts, 
which require good visibility of both the economic environ-
ment and the contractor’s ability to fulﬁ l its role with no rene-
gotiation at a later date.
The three tools of public procurement
Traditional procurement
According to the Observatoire économique de l’achat 
public (OEAP, French Economic Observatory of Public 
Procurement), procurement contracts, which are designed to 
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1 Australian Industry Commission (1996): Competitive Tendering and Contracting by Public Sector Agencies, Australian Government Publishing Service, Report 
no 48.
2  According to the deﬁ nition adopted by the OECD, public procurement covers intermediate purchases by public administrations, investment expenditure 
and social transfers in kind by means of commercial services (excluding Social Security). Other measures are also possible, based on national accounting or 
contract inventories. Discrepancies between diﬀ erent measurements can be signiﬁ cant owing to diﬀ erences in scope or accounting conventions or indeed 
as a result of the very fragmented gathering of information relating to contracts.
3 See Laﬀ ont J-J. and J. Tirole (1993): A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation, MIT Press.
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satisfy needs for works, supplies or services, accounted for 
around EUR72 billion exclusive of tax in France in 2013 (for 
some 96,500 contracts). The OEAP data, however, is incom-
plete owing to the declaration threshold of EUR90,000 and 
the absence of any control or penalty in the event of failure 
to submit the required declaration. Furthermore, the OEAP 
does not take into account the expenses incurred by state 
operators and state-owned companies, or even those incur-
red by companies with public service delegations (such as 
motorway concessionary companies and mixed economy 
companies, for example). With this in mind, procurement 
contracts are believed to amount to some EUR200 billion a 
year in France, or 10% of the GDP.4
Public service delegations
Public service delegations (PSDs) encompass all contracts 
(primarily leasing and concession contracts) whereby a public 
legal entity entrusts the management of a public service for 
which it is responsible to a public or private delegate –the 
contractor– in return for a payment that depends largely on 
the results of the service operation. PSDs are used for mass-
catering, water and sanitation, district heating, transport, 
sports facilities, etc. Unfortunately, there is no PSD observa-
tory in France to inventory calls for tenders and contracts sig-
ned and thereby evaluate the weight that they hold within the 
French economy. It is estimated that PSDs in France account 
for a volume of business amounting to over EUR100 million 
a year for operators alone5 in terms of value, or around 5% 
of the GDP (around half of which is generated by transport 
initiatives).6
Public private partnerships
Launched in June 2004, public private partnerships –simi-
lar to private ﬁ nance intitiative (PFI) contracts in the UK– 
enables a public entity to entrust a company with a global 
project as part of a long-term contract and in return for a 
staggered payment from the public entity. It is used for major 
construction projects (educational establishments, train sta-
tions, etc.), urban infrastructure (street lighting, roads, etc.) 
and even sports and cultural facilities (theatres, stadiums, 
swimming pools, etc.). The introduction of public private 
partnerships was primarily designed to help France 
catch-up to other countries such as the United Kingdom, 
which has used this type of tool since the early 1990s. 
Great progress was made in the number of public private 
partnerships signed between 2005 and 2012, at which point 
they accounted for up to 5% of public investment in France, 
despite still falling a long way behind the other two public 
procurement tools available (around 0.2% of the GDP).
The three tools from a risk-sharing perspective
The three public procurement tools outlined above diﬀ er with 
regards to risk-sharing between the public authority and the 
contractor executing the contract (see table). The PSD, for 
example, involves a payment that is both deferred and made by the 
user rather than by the public authority, meaning that the demand-
side risk is born by the delegate contractor. In the case of public 
private partnerships, meanwhile, payment is deferred but 
always made by the public authority, which therefore bears the 
risk associated with demand.
Public
contracts
Public service 
delegations 
Public private 
partnerships
Payment deferred No Yes
generally by the user
Yes
by the public authority
Transfer of production risk (associated with the service or infrastructure) Yes Yes Yes
Transfer of demand-related risk No Yes No, or very little
Transfer of risk associated with operating costs Yes
in service contracts
Yes Yes 
partially
Global contract No, with the exception 
of CREMsb
Yes Yes
Project management  Public Private Private
Duration of contract Short-medium term Medium-long term Long term
The transfer of risk in the various public procurement toolsa
Notes: a ‘Transfer of risk’ is to be understood as a transfer to the contractor, meaning that it then becomes responsible in this respect (cost or demand); 
b CREMs are global public contracts whereby a public entity can entrust a general mission to a single successful tenderer. This could relate to the 
design and construction of structures (design and creation contracts) or indeed to design and/or construction, operation and maintenance (CREM/
REM). Unlike public parivate partnerships, such contracts remain subject to the rules regarding traditional procurement contracts. Having been added 
to the Code des marchés publics (Public Procurement Code) toolbox in 2011, the use of CREMs and REMs (Art. 73) is somewhat limited in regulatory 
terms and rather uncommon at present.
Source: Authors.
4 See, for example, the French public contract mediation site: www.economie.gouv.fr/mediation-des-marches-publics/guide-osez-commande-publique
5  The price the consumer pays does not always go entirely to private operators but can go to the authorities involved in the event that they are funding part 
of the investment.
6  French Institute of Delegated Management (IGD) (2011): Aspects économiques et comptables des investissements dans les PPP.
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These three forms of contract agreement can indeed be 
combined to create what is actually a continuum of poten-
tial contracts. For example, in order to take the risk of traf-
ﬁ c into account without transferring said risk entirely to the 
delegate, and in accordance with the recommendation put 
forward by some economists,7 the duration of concession 
contracts (DSPs) is sometimes itself dependent upon proﬁ ta-
bility in that the contract is terminated upon reaching a given 
proﬁ tability threshold. Such is the case of the Millau viaduct 
contract, for example, which was signed for a duration of 
78 years but oﬀ ers the option, valid from 2044 onwards, that 
the contract be terminated early, once the actual cumulative 
turnover generated exceeds three hundred and seventy-ﬁ ve 
million euros. The duration of the contract is therefore adap-
ted to reﬂ ect the levels of traﬃ  c generated, meaning that the 
demand-side risk is no longer born solely by the contractor.
Managing public contracts: 
observations and foreseeable changes
Contracts are generally signed following some form of com-
petitive process and give rise to issues associated with mana-
gement and expertise at every stage of the contract from 
selection to execution monitoring and closure. The diﬃ  cul-
ty for the public authority lies in the fact that neither can it 
directly observe the contractor’s performance (asymmetry of 
information) and nor can it foresee all of the hazards to which 
the contract will be subject over the course of its execution.
Contract negotiation and renegotiation
The diﬃ  culty begins at the company selection stage, which 
generally involves a tendering process, with the risk of col-
lusion in the case of concentrated markets,8 the risk of “the 
winner’s curse” (where the best oﬀ er is made by the most 
optimistic company and not the most eﬃ  cient), the risk of 
receiving overly aggressive oﬀ ers designed solely to ensure 
selection, with the aim of renegotiating the contract at a later 
date, and the risk of corruption.9
The partner selection stage is particularly diﬃ  cult in that the 
public authority cannot always limit itself, in an invitation to 
tender, to the lowest bidder without any negotiation or even 
“competitive dialogue” (cf. inset). As Germany, France places 
signiﬁ cant importance on invitations to tender with negotia-
tion (accounting for 30% of procurement contracts in terms 
of value if negotiated procedures and competitive dialogue 
are combined), although open invitations to tender without 
negotiation is still the rule (see ﬁ gure). In the United Kingdom, 
meanwhile, restricted invitations to tender are more common.
Observation 1. Negotiated selection 
procedures are not commonly used in Europe.
The process of selecting companies is made even more dif-
ﬁ cult by the frequent renegotiation of contracts after they 
are signed, a practice that is particularly widespread in the 
case of PSDs (with renegotiation levels varying between 40% 
and 92% depending on the sector and country in question).10 
Renegotiation weakens invitations to tender by encouraging 
opportunistic behaviour (aggressive bids in which the com-
panies willingly submit a low bid in anticipation of the fact 
that they will renegotiate the contract during the execution 
stage). The invitation to tender mechanism, therefore, no 
longer necessarily results in the best candidate being selec-
ted (in other words, the lowest bidder or the one oﬀ ering the 
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7  Engel E., R. Fischer and A. Galetovic (2001): ‘Least-Present-Value-of-Revenue Auctions and Highway Franchising’, Journal of Political Economy, vol. 109, 
no 5, October, pp. 993-1020.
8  In the ﬁ eld of procurement contracts, the example of secondary schools in the Paris region is a good illustration of the strategies that companies can 
implement in order to eliminate the competition when it comes to invitations to tender (see the 2007 decision no 07-D-15 by the Autorité de la concurrence, 
French Competition Authority); with regards to PSDs, see, for example, the case of public urban passenger transport (2005 decision no 05-D-38 by the 
Autorité de la concurrence).
9  The European Union, in its anti-corruption report (COM(2014) 38 ﬁ nal), noted that corruption alone costs the European economy some EUR120 billion a 
year and that public contracts are particularly aﬀ ected. Corruption could increase the cost of public procurement by 20-25%, and in certain, more limited, 
cases, by up to 50%. The OECD points out that “the ﬁ nancial interests at stake, and the close interaction between the public and private sectors, make public 
procurement a major risk area […]”, p. 21.
10  Estache A. and S. Saussier (2014): ‘Public-Private Partnerships and Eﬃ  ciency: A Short Assessment’, CESifo DICE Report, no 3/2014, pp. 8-13.
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best value for money) but rather the one that has the greatest 
faith in their power of renegotiation.11 It is also very diﬃ  cult 
to introduce a truly incentive contract under such conditions. 
The renegotiation of contracts therefore tends to limit or even 
eliminate the beneﬁ ts of competitive tendering procedures.12
Observation 2. A signiﬁ cant proportion 
of public contracts with private partners 
are later renegotiated.
Renegotiations are, however, useful when they enable the 
contract to reﬂ ect new circumstances, notably in the case 
of complex and long-term contracts. The aim is therefore to 
encourage beneﬁ cial changes whilst ﬁ ghting opportunistic 
renegotiations, which requires transparency and competency 
on the part of the public party.
Transparency and competency
A study carried out by the OECD13 observes certain failings 
in public contracts with regards to transparency. Information 
regarding amendments to contracts and the monitoring of 
expenditure in public contracts in particular is diﬃ  cult to 
access in many countries, something that is true of all of the 
public procurement tools.
Transparency is, of course, crucial at every stage of the public 
procurement process for the purposes of ensuring freedom of 
access (possibility of being fully aware of the needs expressed 
by the public entity) and equality of treatment (prohibition of 
any form of discrimination that concerns all stages of the 
procedure). It should also be possible that the renegotiation 
of contracts be monitored by the taxpayers that fund them. 
Whilst transparency comes at an immediate cost to both the 
public authorities and private operators, it is essential to ensu-
ring that the principles on which the public procurement sys-
tem is based are upheld as well as it is crucial to assessing 
its performance. The issue is then one of enabling a faster 
and wider dissemination of information regarding the awar-
ding and execution stages of any form of public procurement 
contract.
Observation 3. There is a lack of data 
for monitoring changes in the public 
procurement system and analysing its 
performance, meaning that the ex ante 
and ex post control of contracts is 
consequently limited.
Reﬁ ned management of public contracts requires informed 
and independent players that also have the expertise to deal 
with situations that are sometimes complex. In its report on 
integrity in public contracts, the OECD refers to both the 
lack and mismatch of expert skills on the part of the agents 
responsible for public procurement. The roles of buyer and 
project manager require not only proﬁ ciency in the ﬁ eld of 
law but also in the ﬁ elds of economic analysis and ﬁ nancial 
management. The need for these multiple areas of exper-
tise is vital both at the awarding stage (in terms of planning, 
budgeting, contractual choices and risk management) and at 
the execution stage (in order to protect the project against 
unjustiﬁ ed delays, additional costs or the risk of seeing the 
contracting company build up its own beneﬁ ts were the 
public party to lose interest in the day-to-day management of 
the delegation). The management of public procurement ope-
rations is often entrusted to those with an exclusively legal 
The oﬃ  cial procedures for the awarding 
of public procurement contracts 
(exceeding EU/Community thresholds)a
An invitation to tender is a public procurement proce-
dure whereby the public entity rules in favour of the 
most advantageous economic oﬀ er. The selection pro-
cess does not involve any negotiation and is based on 
a series of speciﬁ c objective criteria of which the appli-
cant is aware. The invitation to tender is said to be open 
in the event that any company can submit a bid.
In the case of a restricted invitation to tender, only appli-
cants that have been pre-selected based on their capa-
bilities (turnover, human resources, etc.) are invited to 
submit a bid. The negotiated procedure, which follows 
the submission of bids, involves the contracting autho-
rity negotiating bids based on their technical and/or 
ﬁ nancial aspects with one or several applicants. There 
is a possibility of negotiation in network sectors, whe-
reas in other sectors it is only permitted above a certain 
threshold determined at European level and in exceptio-
nal cases.
In the event that the public entity is not in a position to 
obtain the technical resources to express its needs or 
to make the necessary legal and ﬁ nancial arrangements 
for the project alone, it can choose to follow a so-called 
competitive dialogue procedure. In this case, it selects 
a certain number of applicants and undertakes a series 
of dialogue-based stages in order to better identify its 
needs and existing technical solutions with the chosen 
applicants prior to launching the invitation to tender.
a The directives apply only to contracts that exceed Community 
thresholds; in the case of works contracts, the invitation to tender 
procedure applies to contracts valued at EUR5.186 million exclu-
sive of tax with no distinction between bodies or sectors. In the case 
of contracts for services and supplies, meanwhile, the threshold is 
EUR207,000 exclusive of tax for regional authorities, EUR134,000 
exclusive of tax for State organisations and EUR414,000 exclusive 
of tax for network sectors. Below these thresholds, the buyers are 
free to implement their procedure as they see ﬁ t, in accordance 
with the constitutional principles of freedom of access to public 
procurement, equality in the treatment of applicants and procedu-
ral transparency.
11  See Athias L. and A. Nuñez (2008): ‘Winner’s Curse in Toll Road Concessions’, Economics Letters, vol. 101, no 3, December, pp. 172-174.
12  See Guasch J-L. (2004): Granting and Renegotiating Infrastructure Concession: Doing It Right, The World Bank. This conclusion has been drawn from the 
analysis of over 1,000 concession contracts signed in Latin America.
13 OECD (2011): Government at a Glance, OECD Publishing, p. 157.
6Les notes du conseil d’analyse économique, no 22
Strengthening the Eﬃ  ciency of Public Procurement
background. Furthermore, frequent changes in the allocation 
of personnel also limit the eﬀ ectiveness of “on-the-job” lear-
ning and “institutional memory”, which in turn limits the abi-
lity of the public authority to eﬀ ectively monitor and control 
contracts that can sometimes span several decades. There is 
therefore a certain dual asymmetry in terms of expertise and 
information which favours the private entity and encourages 
opportunistic renegotiations of the company with the aim of 
securing a larger proportion of the annuity.
Observation 4. The expertise and 
incentives of the public buyer are 
too limited in a context of ubiquitous 
asymmetries of information and in which 
contractual details are signiﬁ cant.
New European directives in favour of negotiation, 
simpliﬁ cation and renegotiation
The new European legislative package on public contracts, 
which is due to be transposed before 18 April 2016,14 repre-
sents an opportunity to develop the public procurement 
system in France. This comprises the rules that govern all 
of the public procurement tools, including public private 
partnerships (that are considered similar to traditional procu-
rement contracts at the European level), during the contract 
awarding and execution stages in particular. The ease of 
resorting to negotiation is one of the primary contributions 
that will be made by the new 2014 procurement contract 
directives. The negotiated procedure, now known as a “com-
petitive procedure with negotiation”, and competitive dia-
logue can now be used in the event that the needs of the 
contracting authority cannot be met using the solutions that 
are immediately available, that service provision relates to a 
design project or innovative solutions, or even in the case of 
a “complex” contract. The use of a simple invitation to ten-
der will only be mandatory in the case of purchases of stan-
dard products, services or works. This relaxing of the condi-
tions governing the use of negotiated procedures brings the 
“classic sectors” directive closer into line with the directive 
on network sectors. Furthermore, the negotiated procedure 
is becoming the standard framework for the awarding of 
concession contracts.
The directives will make the sworn statement system more 
widespread for the purposes of alleviating the administra-
tive burden that companies bidding for public contracts 
must bear. This statement will be based on a standardised 
European form known as the European Single Procurement 
Document (ESPD), the template of which was presented by 
the Commission in January 2015. Only the bidder to whom 
the contract is to be awarded should be obliged to provide 
proof of the accuracy of the information contained in the 
ESPD. Furthermore, it will be compulsory for the information 
exchanged in the framework of such procedures to be made 
paperless as of 18 October 2018.
Directives on public contracts had thus far been limited 
to the rules governing the awarding of contracts. The new 
directives now outline the potential situations in which 
contracts may be modiﬁ ed over the course of their execu-
tion. Modiﬁ cations amounting to less than 10% of the initial 
value of the contract for supplies and services and 15% for 
works are permitted, along with modiﬁ cations that are either 
not substantial or had been incorporated in the contract in 
the form of price revision clauses or clear options, regardless 
of their value. Moreover, amendments can be concluded in 
the case of unforeseen events or where additional services 
have become necessary and a change of contracting party 
is not possible or would represent a major drawback, provi-
ded that the modiﬁ cation does not alter the general nature of 
the contract and that it does not result in more than a 50% 
increase in the value of the contract. In the event of succes-
sive modiﬁ cations, the directive stipulates that this threshold 
of 50% shall apply to each modiﬁ cation and not to their cumu-
lative value. Concessions can also be signiﬁ cantly modiﬁ ed 
under the same conditions and to the same extent as procu-
rement contracts.
Observation 5. The forthcoming 
transposition of European directives will 
relax the rules governing public procurement 
contracts whilst developing negotiation 
at the awarding stage and facilitating 
renegotiation at the execution stage.
Improving public contract management
The new provisions associated with the directives on tradi-
tional procurement and concession contracts are indicative 
of a move towards a new vision of public service manage-
ment that grants greater freedom to contracting authorities. 
In order to take full advantage of this development in terms 
of public procurement eﬃ  ciency, however, it is essential that 
progress be made simultaneously in three complementary 
aspects, namely transparency, competition and expertise, 
whilst clarifying the objectives of the public procurement 
system.15
14  Directives 2014/24/EU regarding the awarding of public procurement contracts (so-called ‘classic’ sectors) and 2014/25/EU regarding the awarding of 
contracts in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors (so-called ‘special’ sectors), cf. Oﬃ  cial Journal of the European Union, 28 March 2014. 
Furthermore, the Directive of the European Parliament and the Conseil sur l’attribution des concessions (Council on the Awarding of Concessions, which 
correspond to the French public service delegations), namely Directive 2014/23/EU, was adopted by the European Parliament on 15 January 2014 and by 
the Council of the European Union on 11 February 2014.
15  The recommendations outlined thereafter apply only to those contracts and PSDs aﬀ ected by the European directives, that are those whose values exceed 
the Community thresholds (see inset).
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Clarifying the objectives of the public procurement 
system
As we have seen above, the signiﬁ cant amounts at stake in the 
public procurement system make it a potential lever for achie-
ving social, environmental and innovation-related objectives, 
in which case the public authority must incorporate these cri-
teria at the contractor selection stage. The new directives on 
traditional procurement and concession contracts leave it up 
to the States to decide whether these objectives are compul-
sory or optional. It is important to note that the public autho-
rity has at its disposal a number of more direct and eﬀ ective 
ways of achieving the objectives pursued (by means of taxes 
and/or subsidies), without challenging the legitimacy of such 
objectives. It is incongruous, for example, to barely tax car-
bon emissions whilst incorporating vague environmental sus-
tainability criteria into public contracts.
Using public procurement to achieve social, environmental 
and innovation-related objectives is ineﬀ ective for a number 
of reasons. Firstly, a policy designed to rectify a market fai-
lure must be uniform and comprehensive if it is to be eﬀ ec-
tive. Conversely, and by way of an example, incorporating 
greenhouse gas emission criteria into public procurement 
operations amounts to placing a greater value on a tonne of 
carbon than does the carbon tax or the market value of tra-
dable emission rights, which is ineﬀ ective for two reasons. 
On the one hand, as is the case with any policy that entails 
diﬀ erentiated carbon prices, this increases the overall cost of 
achieving the environmental objective. On the other hand, a 
low-emission company will specialise in public contracts, in 
which it will have a competitive advantage, whilst its higher-
emission counterpart will specialise in other contracts, whe-
ther public or private, that are not bound to this objective; as 
a result, contracts are not necessarily shared rationally and 
the reduction in pollutant emissions is minimal.
Furthermore, such objectives give rise to certain diﬃ  culties 
with regards to measurement. Unlike the State, local public 
authorities do not necessarily have the means to measure 
pollution. Moreover, companies often operate in a number of 
markets, both public and private, so how does one establish 
whether such pollution is linked to the activity in question or 
to another (since the company will always choose the most 
beneﬁ cial allowance)? Furthermore, diﬀ erentiation between 
companies will be more intense as a result, thus reducing the 
intensity of the competition between them. Finally, taking into 
account various objectives increases the (ever-present) risk of 
favouritism. A public authority can, for example, place great 
importance on the implications in terms of local employment.
Recommendation 1. Recognise that the 
aim of public procurement, regardless of 
the values at stake, is primarily to meet 
an identiﬁ ed need by achieving the best 
possible performance in terms of cost 
and service or expected functionalities. 
Entrusting the public procurement 
system with the task of achieving social, 
environmental and innovation-related 
objectives is ineﬀ ective.
Increasing competition
Managing negotiation at the bid selection stage
European directives leave much room for negotiation at the 
bid selection stage. Provided that it is well managed, such 
negotiation can be highly beneﬁ cial to the public procure-
ment process in the following ways:
 – in the case of complex operations, negotiation has 
the potential to improve the ﬁ ne-tuning of contracts 
by helping the public party to express its needs and 
by identifying unforeseen competitive and potentially 
innovative solutions;16
 – negotiation at the selection stage reduces the likelihood 
of the contract being renegotiated at a later date17 wit-
hout necessarily increasing prices;18
 – contractors are required to justify the various com-
ponents of their bids at the negotiation stage, which 
reduces the risk of collusion and cover bids (bids that 
are intentionally overvalued with the aim of encoura-
ging the public authority to select the company chosen 
by the agreement).
All things considered, we believe that introducing a negotia-
tion stage between the contracting parties is a positive move. 
From a theoretical perspective, the ex ante transaction costs 
associated with negotiated procedures help create more 
comprehensive contracts that are consequently more robust 
when it comes to renegotiation.19
Nevertheless, aside from the risk of favouritism, the negotia-
ted procedure has another potential pitfall, and the authori-
ties may wish to use this to bring prices down if the negotia-
tion stage involves only the ﬁ nancial proposal put forward by 
bidders. In anticipation of this, companies will initially raise 
their bid to a higher level, rendering the negotiation mea-
ningless unless it changes the technical characteristics that 
the authorities seek. If the negotiation relates to the technical 
16  Bajari P.,R.S. McMillan and S. Tadelis (2009): ‘Auctions versus Negotiations in Procurement: An Empirical Analysis’, Journal of Law, Economics, and 
Organization, vol. 25, no 2, pp. 372-399.
17  Guasch J-L., J-J. Laﬀ ont and S. Straub (2008): ‘Renegotiation of Concession Contracts in Latin America: Evidence from the Water and Transport Sectors’, 
International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol. 26, no 2, pp. 421-442.
18  Chever L. and J. Moore (2012): ‘Negotiated Procedures Overrated? Evidence from France Questions the Commission’s Approach in the Latest Procurement 
Reforms’, European Procurement and Public Private Partnership Law Review, vol. 4, pp. 228-241.
19  Tirole J. (2009): ‘Cognition and Incomplete Contracts’, American Economic Review, vol. 99, no 1, March, pp. 265-294.
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aspects of the bids, however, it can beneﬁ t a competitor by 
enabling them to improve their original bid. The negotiated 
procedure is therefore accompanied by the risk of competi-
tors’ ideas being “plundered”.
European law lays down a principle of traceability and trans-
parency of negotiation, yet fails to outline the accurate terms. 
The transposition of the directives represents an opportunity 
to implement measurements that enable negotiations to be 
more eﬀ ectively controlled.
In order to implement the principle of traceability and thus 
avoid the pitfalls associated with the negotiated procedure, 
we would suggest that the authorities be required to produce 
two summary reports, the ﬁ rst focusing on the analysis of 
the bids prior to the start of negotiations, the second on the 
analysis of the bids once negotiations have ended. These two 
reports already exist in the framework of the “Sapin” pro-
cedure that applies to public service delegations in France 
and would be extended to all negotiated procedures. In the 
case of public service delegations, the originality would lie in 
the obligation to indicate the outcomes of the negotiations, 
particularly with regards to the technical aspects of the bids 
and the content of the commitments made by the applicants. 
In the case of public procurement contracts, the additional 
work that such reports would create would be oﬀ set by the 
likely reduction in the depth of the report justifying the use of 
negotiation procedures.
Recommendation 2. Make it compulsory 
for the public party to provide and 
publish online two summary reports on 
the analysis of the bids both prior to and 
following the negotiation stage.
Competition and reputation of applicants
The directives on public contracts provides for the possibility 
of ruling out a tendering company having defaulted on a past 
contract.20 This provision is designed to encourage compa-
nies to honour their contractual commitments and can help 
prevent strategic behaviour looking at winning a contract by 
under-estimating the costs involved, for example. The more 
complex the contract, and therefore the greater the likelihood 
of renegotiation, the more important this provision is to the 
public party.21 The beneﬁ ts of this mechanism have already 
been conﬁ rmed by an empirical study conducted on a major 
Italian public utility that had introduced an experimental sco-
ring system for its sub-contractors and subsequently used 
a reputation-related criterion in its selection procedures. 
The study concluded that this resulted in improved quality 
and that basic rules of scoring based on reputation can pre-
vent favouritism and the creation of barriers to entry for new 
arrivals with no prior experience with the public contracting 
party.22 These results, whilst not of general applicability to all 
sectors and all countries, suggest that contractors value their 
reputation and that it can be useful to take it into account 
during the selection procedure.
Eﬀ orts must, however, be made in order to make informa-
tion regarding a contractor’s reputation more easily acces-
sible to public authorities and to ensure that such informa-
tion is both objective and veriﬁ able in order to prevent any 
authorities that might use it from ﬁ nding themselves in a 
diﬃ  cult position (their decision to rule out a given contrac-
tor could be contested as being unfounded and restricting 
competition). Such systems for sharing information exist in 
the United States23 and in South Korea.24 Without necessa-
rily orchestrating the temporary exclusion of companies from 
invitations to tender as is the case in South Korea, the cen-
tralisation and more accessible sharing of information regar-
ding their performance over the past ﬁ ve years, by means 
of a dedicated national platform or an extension of the exis-
ting Plate-forme des achats de l’État (PLACE, French Public 
Procurement Platform), could improve the eﬃ  ciency of the 
public procurement system, which would facilitate the pos-
sibility oﬀ ered by the new directives of ruling a company out 
based on its past performance.
Recommendation 3. Centralise 
information regarding the past 
performance of contractors for the 
purposes of facilitating and encouraging 
the use of such information at the 
awarding stage so as to penalise less 
reliable companies in accordance with 
the terms outlined in the directive without 
running any legal risks.
20  In accordance with Article 57 of the directive, exclusion is permitted “where the economic operator has shown signiﬁ cant or persistent deﬁ ciencies in the 
performance of a substantive requirement under a prior public contract, a prior contract with a contracting entity or a prior concession contract which led 
to early termination of that prior contract, damages or other comparable sanctions”.
21  Tadelis S. (2006): Incentives and Award Procedures: Competitive Tendering versus Negotiations in Procurement, Handbook of Procurement, Cambridge 
University Press, pp. 121-139.
22  Spagnolo G. (2012): ‘Reputation, Competition and Entry in Procurement’, International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol. 30, no 3, pp. 291-296.
23  In the United States, and since 2010, the Federal Awardee Performance and Integrity Information System (FAPIIS) Internet application has been combining 
multiple sources of information (including the Past Performance Information Retrieval, PPIRS, and the Contractor Performance System, CPS) and helping 
the federal departments responsible for purchasing to select their suppliers by providing them with relevant and up-to-date information on a company’s 
background over the past ﬁ ve years.
24 Under the aegis of the public agency responsible for all of the purchases made by the State and by public administrations, companies that fail to observe 
contractual deadlines are ‘blacklisted’ for three months if the delay in delivery is less than a month, for six months for delays of less than six months and for 
a year for delays upwards of six months. In the event of failure to observe quality requirements, the company is sanctioned for a period of one year.
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Paperless contracts
Paperless contracts (the possibility of entering into contracts 
electronically, either by means of email or using an online 
platform) promote a faster and wider circulation of informa-
tion. Around 11% of the total value of contracts in France 
are paperless, according to the OEAP, although the European 
directives require that all contracts will be paperless by 
2018. Alongside this objective, thought must be given to the 
number of electronic advertising and application platforms 
available. Nowadays, such platforms exist at all administra-
tive levels –local, departmental, regional and now even natio-
nal with the introduction of the PLACE platform. Whilst tur-
ning to paperless contracts is designed to facilitate access to 
the public procurement process, the dispersal of information 
across various websites requires companies to fund services 
to research contracts that might interest them, thus restricting 
their participation (particularly where SMEs are concerned) in 
invitations to tender. Furthermore, each platform has its own 
characteristics and the documents required are not always the 
same, which increases the cost to prospective bidders.
In this respect, the example of Korea, where the Public 
Procurement Service (PPS) developed an electronic platform 
known as KONEPS (Korea ON-line E-Procurement System) 
set up in 2002, is instructive. KONEPS managed over 55.5 bil-
lion euros’ worth of public procurement transactions in 2013, 
or around 65% of the country’s total public procurement tran-
sactions. The platform is used by over 267,000 companies 
and 46,000 public organisations and improves both transpa-
rency and provision of information to the relevant parties and 
has signiﬁ cantly simpliﬁ ed the procedures involved in sub-
mitting a bid (with tenderers having only one application to 
complete for all future applications).
Recommendation 4. Introduce (or 
maintain) electronic advertising and 
application platforms only at regional 
level and upload all of the information to 
a national platform. Bring the practices 
adopted by the diﬀ erent platforms into 
line with the most eﬀ ective regional 
initiatives.
Increasing transparency
The following proposals are intended to increase transparency 
with regards to the placing and execution of public contracts. 
What is important is not improving transparency as such (since 
greater transparency can sometimes have a negative impact 
by facilitating agreements, for example) but rather improving 
the accountability of public decision-makers.
Transparency and accountability of public buyers
Greater transparency within the public procurement system 
has to go hand in hand with more ﬂ exible awarding proce-
dures and a greater possibility of renegotiating contracts. 
Beyond the developments suggested above, public authori-
ties should be required to systematically publish data rela-
ting to public procurement, particularly with regards to the 
reasons behind their choices. Indeed, provided that the most 
economically advantageous bid25 is selected, in accordance 
with the criterion/criteria outlined in the public invitation 
to tender notice or in the bidding rules and regulations, it 
is useful to inform the unsuccessful applicants, as well as 
the stakeholders, of the reasons for which the public autho-
rity has chosen one bid over another. The choice is made by 
the Commission d’appel d’oﬀ res (CAO, Tender Commission) 
for local and regional authorities. Even if no text explicit-
ly provides for any report in particular, the Ministry of the 
Economy has nevertheless published online a standard bid 
analysis report and minutes from the CAO meeting in accor-
dance with which it selects the best bid. Reports can cur-
rently only be provided at the request of companies whose 
bids have not been successful. An appeal may be submit-
ted to the Commission d’accès aux documents administratifs 
(CADA, Commission on Access to Administrative Documents) 
in the event of a refusal being opposed by the public entity. 
For the purposes of improving transparency and establishing 
an element of accountability on the part of public buyers, we 
would suggest that such reports, which already exist in the 
vast majority of cases, be made public. Paperless contracts 
and the introduction of platforms designed to centralise bids 
can promote transparency among public contracts and pro-
vide a place for publishing said reports.
Recommendation 5. Make it compulsory 
for a bid analysis report to be published 
online, along with the relevant legal 
information (procedure, selected bid, 
number of bidders, etc.).
Managing and ensuring transparency in renegotiation
The new European directives recognise that public procure-
ment contracts are incomplete and leave a great deal of room 
for potential renegotiation at the contract execution stage. 
Whilst this initiative is certainly a welcome one with regards 
to adapting to unforeseen events, it is nevertheless important 
that the parties feel bound by the contract. In the absence of 
any ﬁ rm commitment, either party stands to lose the value of 
any contract-speciﬁ c investment, the initial tendering process 
can be distorted and the taxpayer or user wronged. It is the-
refore important to oﬀ er the ordering party and contracting 
25  The most economically advantageous bid is the one that best meets all of the criteria governing the awarding of the contract. It depends on the weighting 
of the criteria, which is itself subjective, and on the scoring of the bid, which is also partly subjective, by the buyer in relation to each of the criteria. One 
alternative to choosing the most advantageous economic oﬀ er is choosing the lowest bid, based solely on the ﬁ nancial aspect and therefore leaving the 
buyer no room for discretion.
10
Les notes du conseil d’analyse économique, no 22
Strengthening the Eﬃ  ciency of Public Procurement
companies some form of incentive to clearly outline the nature 
of the contract and to clearly link the latter to the achievement 
of observable exogenous variables (such as inﬂ ation) in order 
to limit the potential for renegotiation as much as possible. 
Nevertheless, the risk of renegotiation cannot be eliminated 
altogether. Indeed, renegotiation can also help to improve the 
initial contract. Improving the transparency of renegotiation 
procedures would help limit this problem and ensure that the 
rules governing renegotiation are adhered to.
One simple and inexpensive way of increasing transparen-
cy would be to introduce a speciﬁ c disputes procedure for 
amendments to public procurement contracts in the form of 
an “amendment summary” procedure. This procedure would 
be quick, as are pre-contractual and contractual summary pro-
ceedings,26 and would improve transparency and accountabi-
lity on the part of public authorities. The “amendment summa-
ry” procedure would enable any interested third party (prefect, 
elected representative, company, citizen, etc.) to request that 
an amendment be cancelled. Any failure to observe the legal 
rules (threshold calculation, modiﬁ cation of the object of the 
contract, fraud, etc.) and unjustiﬁ ed additional costs would 
constitute reasons that might be invoked. The time limit for 
appeal could be set at one month from the date on which the 
‘amendment notice’ is published via a medium that would 
make any interested third party aware of its execution (such 
as in the Bulletin oﬃ  ciel des annonces des marchés publics, 
BOAMP, Oﬃ  cial Bulletin of Publication of Public Procurement 
Notices, for example).27 Amendment proposals would be simul-
taneously published and sent electronically to applicant com-
panies, to a pre-established list of interested third-parties and 
more generally to any third party that might have so requested 
beforehand. The publication would notably have to specify the 
initial value of the contract, the value of the increase and the 
object of the amendment in order for this solution to be eﬀ ec-
tive. Any person who so requests would be able to receive noti-
ﬁ cation of the amendment and of its characteristics. The time 
limit for appeal of one month would, as is the case with pre-
contractual summary proceedings, be a standstill period (mea-
ning that the amendment would only come into force once 
the time limit had expired). In return, once the time limit has 
passed, it would no longer be possible to contest the amend-
ment on its purely legal aspects.28
The amendment summary procedure would come into eﬀ ect 
beforehand and would therefore be more eﬀ ective than an a 
posteriori evaluation. The use of the procedure is not, howe-
ver, self-evident. Firstly, there is the issue of free riders, in 
that the gains associated with making the right decision in 
the framework of the amendment summary procedure are 
scattered. Then, of course, companies in the sector will not 
always be willing to contest the validity of a renegotiation pro-
cess since they generally stand to gain very little whilst ris-
king getting on the wrong side of the ordering party.29
With this in mind, the possibility of ﬁ ling amicus curia e com-
ments with the judge during the amendment summary pro-
cedure could prove useful. It is also important to consider 
the possibility of making such comments conﬁ dentially (mea-
ning that the identity of the disclosing party is not divulged to 
the ordering party in order to avoid any retaliation in future 
contracts). Conversely, of course, it is important to prevent 
a situation in which the judge is swamped by a landslide of 
information. Short documents summarising the main argu-
ment (possibly complemented by relevant appendices) could 
be used to help achieve this objective.
Recommendation 6. Make it compulsory 
to publish an ‘amendment notice’ as 
soon as the value of the contract varies 
by more than 10%, and introduce a quick 
amendment summary procedure that 
is open to stakeholders. Consider the 
potential introduction of mechanisms 
designed to guarantee the anonymity of 
the parties responsible for the procedure.
(Concurrently) introducing greater transparency 
with regards to publicly managed activities
As we have seen above, the public authority may also choose 
to “do the work themselves” rather than to “delegate”, and 
many local authorities have for example chosen in recent years 
to manage their water systems themselves internally. In order 
to correctly evaluate the various public procurement tools avai-
lable, it is important that the transparency requirements outli-
26  Pre-contractual and contractual summary proceedings involve a quick procedure oﬀ ering the possibility of requesting that a court completely or partially 
annul a procedure or a contract. There were just under 1,100 of these in 2013 with an average decision period of 21 days, cf. Counseil d’État (2014): Le juge 
administratif et la commande publique, Special Report, June, p. 4.
27  In the case of traditional procurement and concession contracts that exceed European thresholds, the new ‘traditional procurement’ and ‘concession’ 
contracts directives make it compulsory for the local public authority to publish a ‘notice of modiﬁ cation’ to the contractor concession – Art. 43 of directive 
2014/23/EU, Art. 72 of directive 2014/24/EU and Art. 89 of directive 2014/25/EU.
28  The administrative judge would have the power to order the annulment of the amendment. The decision would have to be made within a reduced time 
frame so as not to hinder the progress of projects that require the amendment to be quickly executed. The only form of appeal would be the remedy of 
judicial review, as is the case with pre-contractual and contractual summary proceedings.
29  One could make the analogy here with the right to whistle-blow within a company - employees and auditors, for example, have more to lose than they have 
to win, whilst those who are the most strongly encouraged to expose reprehensible acts are journalists and employees beneﬁ ting from the qui tam system 
(that is those receiving a percentage of the savings made in this way): see Dyck A., A. Morse and L. Zingales (2010): ‘Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate 
Fraud?’, Journal of Finance, vol. 65, no 6, pp. 2213-2253. Of course, we do not argue that the two situations are similar, but the case of whistle-blowing clearly 
shows that incentives to participate in the process must be considered.
30  Such as the Organisme national de l’eau et des milieux aquatiques (ONEMA, National Body for Water and Aquatic Environments), which gathers and 
publishes online information relating to the cost, quality and characteristics of public water services, whether managed as a public utility company or as a 
public service delegation, although the information gathered is still incomplete owing to the lack of any obligation or penalties.
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ned above be extended to those activities managed directly by 
the public authority in the event that such activities could have 
been covered by a contract with an external service provider 
(water management, catering halls, parking, etc.).30
Recommendation 7. Apply transparency 
requirements to directly managed activities, 
along with appropriate incentives and 
penalties; make it possible to evaluate 
such activities on a similar basis to those 
delegated to a private partner.
Enhancing the expertise of the public party
Professionalising public buyers
In the majority of OECD countries, the occupation of Public 
Buyer is not speciﬁ cally recognised. In France it has only featu-
red in the Répertoire interministériel des métiers (Interministerial 
Directory of Occupations) since 2010. Administrations have 
long been rebuked for entrusting the management of their 
public contracts to persons with an exclusively legal back-
ground, which is essential to ensuring that the procedures com-
ply with the relevant legislation but not enough to truly opti-
mise the public procurement system. This is not so much the 
case today, with a recent study by the Union des groupements 
d’achats publics (UGAP, French Public Procurement Grouping 
Union) revealing that 63% of public buyers do not have a legal 
proﬁ le.31 This same study, however, indicates that 61% of public 
buyers joined a purchasing department following a period of 
internal mobility, with no prior experience in the ﬁ eld, and that 
only 39% undertook any form of course or training resulting in 
qualiﬁ cation in the ﬁ eld of purchasing. Finally, the study shows 
that over two-thirds of buyers acknowledge the fact that they 
are not very familiar with the economic and industrial fabric and 
nearly half admit that they do not monitor economic or tech-
nological developments. Increasing the professionalisation of 
these roles and the accountability of public procurement mana-
gers and buyers therefore constitute avenues for streamlining 
the procurement process. At the same time, giving agents the 
opportunity to progress and acquire new skills by means of trai-
ning initiatives could lead to a reduction in turnover and the-
refore an accumulation of experience and contract “memory”.
In the case of more complex concession-type contracts and 
public private partnerships, professionalisation should focus 
in particular on the ex post monitoring of contracts. Indeed, 
it is important to understand and to monitor the information 
provided by delegates and to have a comprehensive overview 
of both the economic and technical issues associated with a 
project. This should facilitate the adaptability of the contract 
(renegotiations are essential in the case of long-term contracts) 
whilst strengthening the bargaining power of the public party.32
Recommendation 8. Increase the profes-
sionalisation and expertise of public buyers 
and project managers. Enhance the appeal 
of such professions by means of professional 
development opportunities.
Centralising purchases wherever possible 
and accumulating experience
Centralising the purchasing function (particularly in the in the 
case of traditional procurement contracts for services and 
supplies but also, to a lesser extent, for works) can result in 
substantial savings. Indeed, centralisation helps achieve eco-
nomies of scale by capitalising upon and developing good 
practices, by pooling procedures (reduction in operating and 
awarding costs) and by facilitating collective purchasing. The 
example of South Korea is an interesting one. Of the EUR85 
billion of public procurement transactions made in 2013, the 
Korean PPS managed over 28 billion. The PPS is thus pursuing 
economic eﬃ  ciency objectives (economies of scale, transpa-
rency, simpliﬁ cation, competition, etc.) by grouping together 
public procurement transactions and managing invitations to 
tender. It is also pursuing objectives relating to developing the 
expertise of public administrations (training, lessons learned, 
etc.) and of Korean companies (training and support in order to 
succeed in foreign markets). This being the case, over 66% of 
the total value of public contracts managed by the PPS went to 
SMEs in 2013 (49% in the case of works contracts).
In France, meanwhile, the UGAP, a French central public pro-
curement body run under the joint supervision of the Ministry 
for the Economy, Finance and Industry and the Ministry for 
National Education, is the only non-specialized central public 
procurement body. Its inﬂ uence is also somewhat limited 
since it places only 2 billion euros’ worth of orders a year.
It is important to determine at what level the centralisation 
of purchases would be relevant. The public authority could 
therefore arrange for resources and expertise to be pooled 
within joint service centres managed by regions or inter-
communalities. The existence of such joint services would 
enable smaller authorities and public institutions (chambers 
of trade, prefectures, courts, hospitals, etc.), that would not 
necessarily have the means to recruit speciﬁ c buyers, to pro-
fessionalise their purchasing operations.33
The issue of centralisation is, nevertheless, a complex one. 
On the one hand, centralisation can result in signiﬁ cant 
31  Survey undertaken by the UGAP and Décision Achats Magazine over the second quarter of 2011, to which 370 purchasing managers responded.
32  With regards to public service delegations, the majority of local public authorities call upon the services of specialist ﬁ rms (contracting authority support) 
to help them prepare the invitation to tender and analyse the responses received from applicants.
33  The collective purchasing of electronic communications services by the Syndicat intercommunal de la périphérie de Paris (SIPPEREC, Intercommunal 
Syndicate for the Parisian Periphery for Energy and Communications Networks) is a good example of this.
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gains in terms of eﬃ  ciency (more valuable lessons learned/
greater staﬀ  specialisation, professionalism and ﬁ nally greater 
negotiation power); on the other hand it removes the element 
of accountability and can eventually lead to higher prices, 
as demonstrated by many of the complaints received regar-
ding central purchases (the decision-maker is only partly res-
ponsible for the payment), delays in execution or a limited oﬀ e-
ring that is not ﬂ exible enough to meet speciﬁ c needs.
There are a number of potential solutions when it comes 
to dealing with the problem associated with this removal of 
accountability, none of which are perfect. These include an 
“opt-out” clause, which protects the lower echelons against a 
lack of responsiveness but also reduces eﬃ  ciency and profes-
sionalism gains on the part of the ordering party, and competi-
tion between a number of central buyers all seeking to secure 
a “market share” by increasing their eﬃ  ciency. One of the dan-
gers of the latter solution is the risk of choices being made on 
a more political than economic basis; it is important, therefore, 
to ensure that central purchasing bodies are independent not 
only of subcontracting companies but also of ordering parties.
All things considered, we believe that the centralisation of pur-
chases should be further developed, particularly where stan-
dard goods and services are concerned, but that it should 
remain a possibility that is available to smaller public autho-
rities and not a compulsory system that could result in needs 
not being given the consideration they deserve, an extension 
in time frames, a reduction in choice and even a reduced likeli-
hood of contracts being signed with local players.
Recommendation 9. Centralise the 
purchasing of standard goods and services 
wherever possible; create competition between 
entirely independent and professional central 
purchasing bodies; give public buyers the 
option of decentralising their purchases for 
the purposes of ensuring maximum ﬂ exibility 
where it is required.
Increasing control over the largest contracts
In order to ensure that the three cornerstones of “transparen-
cy”, “competition” and “expertise” increase the eﬃ  ciency of 
the public procurement system, the recommendations outli-
ned above must be accompanied by greater monitoring of the 
public purchase both upstream and downstream where the 
largest contracts are concerned, in which case more costly 
monitoring and supervision is justiﬁ ed. Upstream, it is impor-
tant that a prior evaluation be systematically performed, inclu-
ding the full cost and anticipated advantages for each pro-
ject, in accordance with the public procurement tool selected. 
These prior evaluations, limited to projects exceeding a certain 
threshold, will make it possible to identify the most appropriate 
form of contract to meet the public need and to better com-
prehend the overall cost of the contract in question.34
Such control should be extended downstream by means of 
renegotiation monitoring. In addition to the relevant players 
being held accountable, this control will make it possible to 
compare the conditions under which contracts are executed 
with the conclusions drawn from studies performed at the 
pre-contractual stage and that have resulted in one method of 
organisation being chosen over another. All such evaluations 
should be carried out by an agency, which would also facili-
tate the centralisation of data and results and the possibility of 
comparing the best contractual practices.
Recommendation 10. Entrust the upstream 
and downstream evaluation of all of the public 
procurement tools to an agency in the case of 
amounts exceeding a certain threshold, such 
as EUR50 million.
This threshold should be set realistically in accordance with 
the means allocated to the evaluation agency so as not to 
delay the progress of public investment projects.
Conclusion
The greater freedom that will be granted to French contrac-
ting authorities, notably at the selection stage but also at the 
contract execution stage, could potentially be beneﬁ cial, provi-
ded that this freedom is part of a broader move towards grea-
ter transparency, eﬀ ective competition and the development 
of speciﬁ c expertise.   
113 rue de Grenelle  75007 PARIS (France)           Ph: +33(0)1 42 75 53 00           Fax: +33(0)1 42 75 51 27            @CAEinfo            www.cae-eco.fr
34  In accordance with the Code général des collectivités territoriales (Local and Regional Authorities Code), deliberative assemblies must make a decision based 
on the principle of each public service delegation. Authorities are therefore required to examine and compare the costs, advantages and drawbacks of owner-
managed operation with those of operation by means of delegated management. The studies performed must be impartial and exhaustive. The conditions under 
which these provisions are implemented do, however, vary greatly, as the Cour des comptes observes on a regular basis.
